Abortion, Euthanasia, and the Need to Build a New Culture of Life by Rice, Charles E.
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 12
Issue 2 Symposium on the Beginning and End of Life Article 6
1-1-2012
Abortion, Euthanasia, and the Need to Build a New
Culture of Life
Charles E. Rice
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles E. Rice, Abortion, Euthanasia, and the Need to Build a New Culture of Life, 12 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 497
(1998).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol12/iss2/6
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND THE NEED TO
BUILD A NEW 'CULTURE OF LIFE'
CHARLES E. RICE*
A quarter-century after Roe v. Wade,' the body count shows at
least thirty-seven million innocent human beings killed in this
country by surgical abortions, with an uncountably larger
number killed by intrauterine devices and chemical and other
abortifacients.
It may be helpful in this essay to touch upon six aspects of
this phenomenon:
1. The constitutional status of legalized abortion;
2. The constitutional status of legalized euthanasia;
3. The reality that abortion and euthanasia, largely as a
result of technological developments, are moving
beyond the reach of the law;
4. The effect of the misguided effort of the establishment
pro-life movement to regulate abortion through an
incremental approach;
5. The decisive impact of the contraceptive ethic; and
6. What, if anything, can be done at this time to restore
the right to life?
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF LEGALIZED ABORTION
The constitutional issue in Roe v. Wade is as fundamental as
one can be: In a legal system where personhood is the condition
of possessing rights, including the right to live, is every human
being intrinsically entitled to be regarded as a person? In Roe,
the Court held that "the word 'person' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn."2  The Court
declined to decide whether the unborn child is a human being.
Whether he is or is not a human being, concluded the Court, he
is not a person. The decision, therefore, is effectively the same as
a decision that an acknowledged human being is not a person
and therefore has no constitutional right to live. The basic prin-
ciple of Roe is the principle of the Holocaust, that innocent
human beings can be defined as nonpersons and subjected to
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 158.
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death at the discretion of others.3 It is the principle of the 1857
Dred Scott case, where the Court held that blacks could not be
citizens and said that slaves were property rather than persons.4
The Court in Roe held that abortion prohibitions unconstitu-
tionally infringed upon the mother's right to privacy which the
Court interpreted, in effect, to protect her right to elective abor-
tion at every stage of pregnancy. Even after viability, the Court
said, the state may not prohibit abortion where it is necessary "in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother."5 In the companion case of Doe v. Bolton,6
the Court defined maternal health to include psychological as
well as physical well-being; the Court said that "the medical judg-
ment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emo-
tional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to
the well-being of the patient."7 This flexible criterion is a practi-
cal sanction for abortion on request at every stage until delivery.
Since 1973, the Court has upheld marginal restrictions on
abortion, such as a requirement that abortions be performed by
physicians.' In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,9 the Court upheld
Pennsylvania requirements that the woman be given certain
information about abortion twenty-four hours before the abor-
tion; that a minor must have the consent of at least one of her
parents, or the approval of a judge, before she can have an abor-
tion; and that abortion facilities must comply with record keep-
ing and reporting requirements. But the Court struck down a
requirement that the woman notify her spouse before the abor-
tion. The Court in Casey described the woman's right to an abor-
tion as a "liberty" interest protected under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than simply as an
exercise of the right to privacy.1 ° In the 1997 "right to die" case,
the Court described its Casey ruling as follows:
There, the Court's opinion concluded that 'the essential
holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaf-
firmed.' We held, first, that a woman has a right, before her
fetus is viable, to an abortion 'without undue interference from
the State'; second, that States may restrict post-viability abortions,
3. See Charles E. Rice, Some Reasons for a Restoration of Natural Law
Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 539, 551-55 (1989).
4. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407-10 (1857).
5. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
6. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
7. Id. at 192.
8. See Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam).
9. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
10. See id. at 846-53.
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so long as exceptions are made to protect a woman's life and
health; and third, that the State has legitimate interests through-
out a pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the
life of the unborn child."l
Despite the Court's allowance of marginal restrictions on
abortion, the Court will not allow the states to enact any effective
prohibition of abortion at any stage of pregnancy. The Court has
also imposed severe restrictions on pro-life activities at abortion
sites. 
12
The ultimate legal remedy for the Supreme Court abortion
rulings is a constitutional amendment, expressly establishing in
our basic law that all human beings are entitled to the constitu-
tional right to life. It is doubtful, at best, that the Court would
uphold a statute enacted by Congress to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment by defining all human beings as persons.1
3
Although there is no realistic possibility of enacting such a consti-
tutional amendment or statute in the foreseeable future, per-
sonhood remains the decisive constitutional issue:
[W]hoever is not a person lacks not only the privileges of
citizenship, but even the barest minimum of human rights.
A person need not have every right-prisoners, minors,
and aliens, for example, do not possess the full panoply of
rights and privileges afforded under the Constitution-but
a non-person has no rights whatsoever. A non-person is no
better off than property, entirely subject to the whim of the
owner and whatever permissible regulation the govern-
ment may deign to impose.
The constitutional protection for "persons" simply cannot
function if each individual or class of human beings must
prove explicit inclusion in some unwritten catalogue of
"persons." Does the term "person" include mentally dis-
abled individuals? There is not likely much, if any, explicit
support for that particular proposition in the text, history,
or early application of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
11. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2270 (1997) (quoting
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846).
12. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997)
(invalidating a "floating buffer zone" of 15 feet between protesters and persons
entering or leaving an abortion clinic, but upholding a fixed buffer zone
between protesters and an abortion clinic); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,
Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding a 36-foot buffer zone on a public street in
an area immediately adjacent to an abortion clinic).
13. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (invalidating
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a statute that provided greater
constitutional protection for religious conduct than prior Supreme Court
decisions).
1998]
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ments. Yet these are certainly persons. Does "person"
include citizens of hostile nations? Children under the age
of eighteen? Convicted misdemeanants or felons? Coma-
tose individuals? Each of these classes of human beings
lacks either the legal or physical ability to exercise certain
rights, yet each is unquestionably a class of persons. This is
so, not because members of each class can prove their par-
ticular inclusion under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, but because they are included by virtue of their
humanity. "They.are humans, live, and have their being."
Therefore, "[t]hey are clearly 'persons"' within the mean-
ing of the Constitution. 4
Human offspring conceived but not yet born are likewise
"humans, live, and have their being." They are "a form of
human life," as are infants, toddlers, teens, adults, and the
elderly. As human beings, prenatal children do not need
to overcome any additional hurdles in order to establish
their right to inclusion within the term "person" as used in
the Constitution. Nor does any justification exist for the
arbitrary exclusions of such children from the protection
of basic human rights under the Constitution.
15
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that, if the per-
sonhood of the unborn child is established, the pro-abortion case
"collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed
by the (Fourteenth) Amendment."' 6 As the Supreme Court itself
noted in Roe v. Wade.
When Texas urges that a fetus is entitled to Fourteenth
Amendment protection as a person, it faces a dilemma.
Neither in Texas nor in any other state are all abortions
prohibited. Despite broad proscription, an exception
always exists. The exception contained in Art. 1196, for
the abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for
the purpose of saving the life of the mother, is typical. But
if the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life
without due process of law, and if the mother's condition is
14. Brief of Catholics United for Life et al. at 4-6, Casey (No. 91-744)
(quoting Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (discussing statutory
classifications for illegitimate children)); (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that discrimination against
mentally retarded persons triggers equal protection scrutiny)).
15. Id. (quoting Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520
(1989)).
16. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973).
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the sole determinant, does not the Texas exception appear
to be out of line with the Amendment's command?' 7
Those statements of the Court indicate that a restoration of
personhood to the unborn child, without exceptions, would pre-
vent the states from legalizing any abortions, even those claimed
to be necessary to save the life of the mother. That result is con-
sistent with the common law principle of necessity, which does
not justify anyone taking the life of an innocent non-aggressor
even to save his own life." A constitutional restoration of per-
sonhood would not prevent state legislatures and the Supreme
Court from applying, incorrectly, the law of necessity so as to per-
mit abortion to save the life of the mother. But no constitutional
amendment on any subject can be immune to misconstruction.
The object of the restoration of personhood is simply to restore
to the unborn child the same right to live which is enjoyed by his
older brother and his grandmother. Despite the practical impos-
sibility of its achievement in the foreseeable future, the restora-
tion of that right ought to remain the central legal and political
objective of the pro-life movement.
However, as far as the Supreme Court is concerned, includ-
ing the "pro-life" dissenting Justices, the personhood issue has
been definitively settled against personhood. Every member of
the Court accepts the holding of Roe that the unborn child is a
non-person. As Justice Stevens noted in Webster
No Member of this Court has ever questioned the holding
in Roe ... that a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even the dissenters in Roe
implicitly endorsed that holding by arguing that state legis-
latures should decide whether to prohibit or to authorize
abortions.... By characterizing [in Webster] the basic ques-
tion as 'a political issue,' . . .Justice Scalia likewise implic-
itly accepts this holding.
19
When Justice Scalia and the otherJustices talk about overrul-
ing Roe, they evidently mean allowing the states to decide
whether to allow or prohibit abortion rather than overruling Roe
on its essential holding that the unborn child is a non-person.
But that states' rights solution is based on the premise that the
unborn child is a non-person. The status of personhood carries
with it a right to the protection of the law, especially with respect
17. Id. at 157 n.54.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842)
(No. 15,383); Regina v. Dudley & Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
19. Webster, 492 U.S. at 568 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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to the right to life. AsJustice Stevens said in the 1986 Thornburgh
case, "unless the religious view that a fetus is a 'person' is
adopted . . . there is a fundamental and well-recognized differ-
ence between a fetus and a human being; indeed, if there is not
such a difference, the permissibility of terminating the life of a
fetus could scarcely be left to the will of the state legislatures. "20
In his Casey opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens explained the
personhood holding of Roe.
The Court in Roe carefully considered, and rejected, the
State's argument "that the fetus is a 'person' within the lan-
guage and meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." . . . After analyzing the usage of 'person' in the
Constitution, the Court concluded that the word 'has
applicability only postnatally.' ... Accordingly, an abortion
is not 'the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth
Amendment protection.' . . . From this holding, there was
no dissent, . . . , indeed, no Member of the Court has ever
questioned this fundamental proposition. Thus, as a mat-
ter of federal constitutional law, a developing organism
that is not yet a 'person' does not have what is sometimes
described as a 'right to life.' This has been and, by the
Court's holding today, remains a fundamental premise of
our constitutional law governing reproductive autonomy.
21
The dissenting Justices in Casey said, in Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's words, "that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and
should be overruled. '22 However, they would "overrule" Roe by
allowing the states to decide whether to allow or prohibit abor-
tion. Chief Justice Rehnquist said that "[a] woman's interest in
having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in ways
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. '23 Justice Scalia
said:
The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on
demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do
so. The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations
upon it, are to be resolved like most important questions in
our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another
20. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 779 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
21. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913-14 (1992) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
23. Id. at 966.
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and then voting. As the Court acknowledges, 'where rea-
sonable people disagree the government can adopt one
position or the other.'
2 4
In any free and just society, there is an indispensable con-
nection between humanity and personhood. The denial of per-
sonhood was the legal technique by which the Nazis set the Jews
on the road to the gas chambers. If an innocent human being is
subject to execution at the discretion of another, he is, in that
most important respect, a non-person. And if he can be defined
as a non-person in the womb so as to be subjected to execution at
the discretion of others, the same thing can be done to his elder
retarded brother or his grandmother. The personhood issue, it
would seem, has been definitively and unanimously decided by
the Supreme Court against the claim of the unborn human
being to be regarded as a person. That personhood could be
definitively restored by a constitutional amendment affirming
the personhood of all human beings with respect to the right to
life. See, for example, the Paramount Human Life Amend-
ment,2 5 which provides, "[t]he paramount right to life is vested
in each human being from the moment of fertilization without
regard to age, health or condition of dependency. '26
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF LEGALIZED EUTHANASIA
While opponents of abortion have been derided for claim-
ing that legalized abortion would put the nation on a slippery
slope to euthanasia, events have proven them correct. Abortion
is merely prenatal euthanasia, as euthanasia is postnatal abortion.
In Washington v. Glucksberg,27 the Court held that there is no
constitutional "right to die" that would require the states to allow
assisted suicide. The Washington statute punishing one who
"knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide" was
therefore upheld as "rationally related to legitimate government
interests. ' 28 The Court, however, did not say whether it would
defer to the legislative judgment so as to uphold a state law
allowing assisted suicide. In 1994, Oregon adopted by a referen-
dum margin of 51 percent to 49 percent a "Death With Dignity
Act", which legalized assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill
24. Id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
25. S.J. Res. 12, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980); H.J. Res. 300, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1980).
26. Id.
27. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
28. Id. at 2271.
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adults. In 1997, Oregon voters rejected, by a 60 percent to 40
percent margin, a proposal to repeal the 1994 Act.29 If the
Supreme Court upholds the Oregon law, it will mean that the
guarantees in the Constitution of the right to life and the equal
protection of the laws do not prevent the states from allowing the
intentional killing of the persons described in the Act.
In Vacco v. Quill,3" the Supreme Court upheld the New York
law which forbids assisted suicide. The Court of Appeals had
held that New York's prohibition of assisted suicide violated the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection because:
those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on
life-support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by
directing the removal of such systems; but those who are
similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of
life-sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death
by self-administering prescribed drugs."1
The Supreme Court, however, upheld the New York statute
on the ground that "the distinction between assisting suicide and
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment ... is certainly rational."
3 2
The Court went on to note that "a patient who commits suicide
with a doctor's aid necessarily has the specific intent to end his or
her own life, while a patient who refuses or discontinues treat-
ment might not."3 Similarly:
a physician who withdraws, or honors a patient's refusal to
begin, life-sustaining medical treatment purposefully
intends, or may so intend, only to respect his patient's
wishes and 'to cease doing useless and futile or degrading
things to the patient when [the patient] no longer stands
to benefit from them.' The same is true when a doctor
provides aggressive palliative care; in some cases, painkil-
ling drugs may hasten a patient's death, but the physician's
purpose and intent is, or may be, only to ease his patient's
pain.
34
The Supreme Court in Vacco relied on its 1990 decision in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,3 5 for the state-
29. See generally the discussion in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, LIFE AT RISK: A CLOSER LOOK AT ASSISTED SUICIDE (1997).
30. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
31. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996).
32. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2298.
33. Id. at 2299.
34. Id. at 2298-99 (quoting Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1996) (testimony of Leon R. Kass, medical doctor)).
35. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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ment that "[t]his Court has also recognized, at least implicitly,
the distinction between letting a patient die and making that
patient die."36 In Cruzan the Court held that Missouri could
require "clear and convincing" evidence of Nancy Cruzan's
intent not to be sustained on a feeding tube before it would per-
mit removal of that tube. On rehearing after the Supreme Court
decision, such "clear and convincing" evidence was found, the
tube was withdrawn and Nancy died." But Cruzan does not for-
bid the states to allow withdrawal of food and water on a lesser
showing of the patient's intent or on the basis that withdrawal is
in the incompetent's best interest in the absence of a showing of
intent. It can be difficult to distinguish legitimate withholding or
withdrawal of medical treatment, including termination of the
administration of food and water that no longer sustains the life
of a patient near death, from actions which are homicidal in
intent. Nevertheless, the rulings in Cruzan and, by implication,
Vacco, can fairly be read as the conferral of constitutional permis-
sion on the states to allow the intentional killing of at least some
patients from whom "treatment" is withdrawn.
The law is a blunt instrument. It should not attempt to
require that excessive treatment be given to impede the act of
dying. There comes a time when a person has done all that is
reasonably required of him to preserve his life, nature should be
allowed to take its course, and the proper judgments of physi-
cians and family should be respected. In this context, a person
should be allowed to die a natural and dignified death. Four
factors, however, distinguish the Cruzan-type case from the diffi-
cult cases of medical judgment from which the law should
abstain:
1. The patient in the Cruzan-type case is not dying or near
death. Nancy Cruzan had a life expectancy of thirty
years. If she were near death, it still should be forbid-
den to kill her intentionally, as by shooting her, even
with her consent. However, if she were in the final
stages of dying, it would be extremely difficult to prove
that the removal of a feeding tube was done with the
intent to cause death rather than to accept the imme-
diately inevitable outcome.
2. Cases of this type do not involve the withdrawal of medical
treatment, including food and water provided by tube, that is
burdensome, dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to
36. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2301.
37. See Andrew H. Malcolm, Nancy Cruzan: End to Long Goodbye, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1990, at 1.
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the expected outcome. The administration of food and
water by tube was effective in sustaining Nancy
Cruzan's life. It was therefore not useless even though
it obviously would not correct her underlying
condition.
3. Contrary to the Supreme Court's statements in Vacco,"8
the removal of the feeding tube, in the usual case,
causes death by starvation and dehydration and not by
an "underlying fatal disease or pathology." The official
cause of Nancy Cruzan's death was "shock due to dehy-
dration due to traumatic brain injury."39 Nancy
Cruzan had no real prospect of recovery from her
underlying condition. But she was not dying when her
tube was withdrawn. She was stable, in no significant
distress and the nourishment she received through the
tube kept her alive. When that tube was withdrawn,
she starved and dehydrated to death. Interestingly, the
petitioners in Vacco, who were attacking the ban on
assisted suicide, implicitly conceded this point:
Patient-plaintiff Jane Doe, like some other termi-
nal patients in the final stages of their illness, thus
had lawfully available to her one method of physi-
cian assistance in ending her suffering. Because
she required a feeding tube for nutrition and had
had one surgically inserted, she could have asked
to have it removed without running afoul of New
York's assisted suicide laws. But while this would
have permitted Jane Doe to die with her physi-
cian's assistance before her cancer ravaged her
further, she would have been subject to what for
her would have been the degrading process of
death by starvation. She (and her family) would
have been relegated to watching-perhaps only in
glimpses as she was roused from a stupor brought
on by malnutrition or medication or both-the
degeneration of her body unto death.4 °
This point is so obvious-that deprivation of food and
water causes death by starvation-that it would not
deserve mention were it not for the effort by the courts
to obscure the reality that we have legalized the inten-
tional killing of innocent persons.
38. See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2298.
39. NEws LEADER (Springfield, Mo.), Dec. 26, 1990, at 1.
40. Respondent's Brief at 16, Vacco (No. 95-1858).
BUILDING A NEW 'CULTURE OF LIFE'
4. In Cruzan, as in the typical such case,41 food and water are
withdrawn with the specific intent to cause the death of the patient.
The removal of Nancy Cruzan's tube was not intended to
relieve pain or to terminate an administration of food and
water that was ineffective to sustain bodily life. The tube
was supposed to sustain Nancy's biological life and it did
that. The intent in removing her tube was precisely to
allow Nancy to starve and dehydrate to death. When the
tube was removed, she did exactly that. The motive or pur-
pose of the removal may have been to relieve the patient of
life considered burdensome or useless, but the clear and
specific intent was to achieve that purpose by means of
intentionally killing the patient. A permissible intention,
on the other hand, would be to ease the excessive pain
caused by the medical treatment itself The removal of the feed-
ing tube in the usual case is notjustified by the principle of
the double effect since the "good" objective, e.g., the relief
of suffering or a burdensome life, is achieved by means of
an intrinsically evil act, i.e., the intentional killing of the
innocent.
4 2
This analysis involves no reflection on the families, such as
the Cruzan family, involved in these difficult situations. They evi-
dently act in good faith in what they see as the best interest and
intention of the patient. The fault is not with the families but
rather with the Supreme Court. The Court has interpreted the
Constitution to authorize the federal and state governments to
permit the execution of the innocent, born as well as unborn.
With respect to the Cruzan-type case, the problem is one of
equal protection of the laws. The Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides: "No state shall ... deny to any person the equal protection
of the laws."' 43 In "right to die" cases, the patients involved are all
"persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
They are all innocent non-aggressors. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment ought to mean that such persons cannot be excluded from
the protection of state homicide laws by permitting them to be
intentionally killed by others in any situation. When a state pro-
tects innocent, non-aggressor persons in general by forbidding
them to be intentionally killed by another, it should be held to
deny equal protection of the laws for the state to exclude from
41. See, e.g., Guardianship of Jane Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (NJ. 1987); In re Lawrence, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991).
42. See Brief for the American Life League at 19-20, Vacco (No. 95-1858).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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that protection some such persons because they are terminally ill
or because they have asked to be killed. Moreover, when an
innocent human being is thus excluded from the protection of
the homicide laws, he is treated by the law as a nonperson.
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court ultimately
upholds a state law allowing active assisted suicide, the Supreme
Court already interprets the Constitution to permit the states to
allow the intentional killing of the innocent. In some cases,
where a treatment or procedure is ineffective or where it is bur-
densome, dangerous or extraordinary or disproportionate to
what it might achieve, the intent of the physician who removes or
withholds that treatment or procedure might not be to kill the
patient. However, in the ordinary case, such as Cruzan, the intent
is precisely to end the patient's life, that is, to kill. In Cruzan, the
Missouri Supreme Court accurately said:
This is also a case in which euphemisms readily find their
way to the fore, perhaps to soften the reality of what is
really at stake. But this is not a case in which we are asked
to let someone die. Nancy is not dead. Nor is she termi-
nally ill. This is a case in which we are asked to allow the
medical profession to make Nancy die by starvation and
dehydration. The debate here is thus not between life and
death; it is between quality of life and death. We are asked
to hold that the cost of maintaining Nancy's present life is
too great when weighed against the benefit that life con-
veys both to Nancy and her loved ones and that she must
die.
4 4
Even if a state forbids assisted suicide, so that a physician
may not legally prescribe for a consenting patient a drug that
directly induces death, such a law will not prevent intentional
killing by withdrawing medical treatment, including nutrition
and hydration, by prescribing pain killers which have the effect
of hastening death and by "terminal sedation." In Vacco v. Quill,
the Supreme Court stated:
Respondents also argue that the State irrationally distin-
guishes between physician-assisted suicide and "terminal
sedation," a process respondents characterize as
"induc[ing] barbiturate coma and then starv[ing] the per-
son to death." . . . Petitioners insist, however, that
"[a]lthough proponents of physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia contend that terminal sedation is covert physi-
cian-assisted suicide or euthanasia, the concept of sedating
44. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Mo. 1988).
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pharmacotherapy is based on informed consent and the
principle of double effect." ... Just as a State may prohibit
assisting suicide while permitting patients to refuse
unwanted lifesaving treatment, it may permit palliative care
related to that refusal, which may have the foreseen but
unintended "double effect" of hastening the patient's
death.... ("It is widely recognized that the provision of
pain medication is ethically and professionally acceptable
even when the treatment may hasten the patient's death, if
the medication is intended to alleviate pain and severe dis-
comfort, not to cause death")."
The Supreme Court allows the states to decline even to try to
distinguish between those who act with and without the intent to
kill.
III. THE REALITY THAT ABORTION AND EUTHANASIA, LARGELY AS
A RESULT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS, ARE MOVING
BEYOND THE REACH OF THE LAW.
A. Abortion
In practical terms, abortion is moving beyond the reach of
the law. The dominant abortion technique of the very near
future will be by early abortifacient drugs and devices. Licensing
and other restrictions will be only marginally effective, at best, in
preventing the use of such abortifacients, especially with respect
to those which also have non-abortive uses. Abortifacients can be
prescribed by any physician, not just abortionists working in
abortion clinics. So no one else will know when a woman is using
an abortifacient. Abortion therefore will be a matter of private
choice beyond the reach of the law. In Roe, the Supreme Court
based the right to an abortion on the right to privacy which it
had discovered lurking in the "penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from"46 the Bill of Rights.4 7 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,48
the Court shifted the basis for the abortion right from privacy to
a "liberty interest,"just as technology was making abortion truly a
matter of privacy.
While the attention of the pro-life movement was focused on
the effort to ban partial-birth abortions, the Food and Drug
Administration gave conditional approval to the Population
45. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2301-02 n.l1.
46. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
47. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973).
48. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Council for the marketing of RU 486.4 ' RU 486, or mifepristone,
can be taken "virtually as soon as a woman knows she is preg-
nant." The Planned Parenthood Federation of America has
obtained FDA approval for a nationwide clinical trial of an early
abortion method using a combination of two drugs-methotrex-
ate and misoprostil-that are now labeled for other purposes. It
has been shown to be "highly effective" when used within the first
nine weeks of pregnancy.5 °
"Planned Parenthood clinics in the Washington area are
offering abortions to women as early as 14 to 21 days after con-
ception. And a few clinics elsewhere in the country are using the
same technique to perform abortions as early as eight to ten days
after conception, before women have missed a period, said
Rosann Wisman, executive director of the Planned Parenthood
Federation of Metropolitan Washington."5 1
Early abortion drugs and devices have a practical immunity
to prohibition because they are treated as contraceptives rather
than abortifacients. In the mid-1960s the leading medical dic-
tionaries, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists (ACOG) and ultimately the relevant federal agencies,
changed the definition of pregnancy so that it would be regarded
as beginning, not at the fertilization of the ovum by the sperm,
but at the implantation of the embryo in the womb, which occurs
five to seven days after fertilization. Joseph R. Stanton, M.D.,
described this process:
Until 1964 there was no scientific disagreement whatsoever
that human pregnancy began at fertilization .... Nor was
there any dispute that conception occurred at the time of
the fertilization of the human ovum by the human
sperm.... Attempts to change the definition of the begin-
ning of pregnancy from the time of fertilization to the
more vague and unprecise time of implantation began seri-
ously in 1964 at the Second International Conference on
Intra-Uterine Contraception .... This was a careful and
calculated effort to make induced abortion socially
acceptable.5 2
49. Gina Kolata, Pill for Abortion Clears Big Hurdle to Its Sale in U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1996, at 1.
50. See Karen Freeman, Planned Parenthood to Participate in Test of Abortion
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1996, at A10.
51. Joyce Howard Price, Abortion Clinics in Area Provide Early Procedure,
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1997, at A3.
52. JOSEPH R. STANTON, M.D. & MARIANNE REA-LUTHIN, WHY HUMAN LIFE
SHOULD BE PROTECTED FROM FERTILIZATION, ONWARD 1 (1975); see generally
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"Shortly thereafter, the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG) appointed a committee on terminol-
ogy which, in 1965, created new definitions of conception and of
the beginning of pregnancy, relating them both to implantation
rather than fertilization of the ovum.
53
Fertilization is the union of spermatozoon and ovum.
Conception is the implantation of a fertilized ovum. "The
definition has been selected deliberately because union of
sperm and ovum cannot be detected clinically unless
implantation occurs."
Pregnancy is the state from conception to expulsion of the
products of that conception.5 4
"'The impact of this change," noted Dr. Stanton, 'is seen in
the following two facts: 1) Stedman's Medical Dictionary
which . . . had defined conception as 'the act of conceiving or
becoming pregnant . . .,'5 changed the definition of concep-
tion . . . to read 'the successful implantation of the blasto-
cyst.... ,5' The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
and the Centers for Disease Control currently accept the 1965
ACOG definition of human pregnancy.' 57
Early abortifacients are widely promoted as contraceptives.
The National Academy of Sciences described RU 486 itself as a
contraceptive in a 1990 report. 58 Numerous other kinds of pills
that have been approved for use in this country are inaccurately
promoted as contraceptives although their effect is to prevent
implantation of the embryo in the womb. And the intrauterine
device apparently operates as an abortifacient by preventing
implantation. 59 "In the latest of a series of new techniques that
blur the line between contraception and abortion, a growing
number of abortion clinics nationwide are offering abortions to
GERMAIN GRISEZ, ABORTION: THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES, AND THE ARGUMENTS
106-16 (1970).
53. Id.
54. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, ACOG
TERMINOLOGY BULLETIN 1-2 (1965).
55. STANTON & RAE-LUTHIN, supra note 52 (citing STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY (20th ed. 1961)).
56. Id. (citing STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (22nd ed. 1972)).
57. Id. (citing letter from Gilbert L. Woodside, Acting Director, National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development, U.S. Dep't of Health,
Education and Welfare, to Joseph Stanton, M.D.); see also CHARLES E. RICE, No
EXCEPTION, A PRO-LIFE IMPERATIVE 59 (1990).
58. See Philip Hilts, U.S. is Decades Behind Europe in Contraceptives, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1990, at 1.
59. See HUMAN LIFE INTERNATIONAL REPORT 5 (Apr. 1990) (containing list
of abortifacient drugs and devices that is published by Pharmacists for Life).
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women as early as 8 or 10 days after conception, before they have
missed a menstrual period."6 °
At least two Justices on the Supreme Court appear to agree
that abortifacients should be treated as contraceptives. The pre-
amble to the Missouri statute in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices," stated that "[t]he life of each human being begins at
conception" and that "[u] nborn children have protectable inter-
ests in life, health, and well-being."62 Five Justices declined to
decide the constitutionality of that preamble because it had no
legal effect on abortions. Justice Stevens, however, argued that
the preamble is unconstitutional. The statute defined "concep-
tion" as "the fertilization of the ovum of a female by a sperm of a
male."63 Justice Stevens stated that "standard medical texts
equate 'conception' with implantation in the uterus, occurring
about six days after fertilization. Missouri's declaration therefore
implies regulation not only of previability abortions, but also of
common forms of contraception such as the IUD, and the morn-
ing-after pill."64 Justice Stevens noted that, "An intrauterine
device, commonly called an IUD, 'works primarily by preventing
a fertilized egg from implanting.' . . . Other contraceptive meth-
ods that may prevent implantation include 'morning-after pills,'
high-dose estrogen pills taken after intercourse, particularly in
cases of rape.., and the French RU 486, a pill that works 'during
the indeterminate period between contraception and abor-
tion.'. . . Low-level estrogen 'combined' pills-a version of the
ordinary, daily ingested birth control pill-also may prevent the
fertilized egg from reaching the uterine wall and
implanting... "65 Justice O'Connor appeared to agree with Jus-




With respect to euthanasia, it will be very difficult for the law
to distinguish among cases of sedation or removal of treatment
so as to determine whether the physician acted with the intent to
relieve pain or the intent to cause death.
60. Tamar Lewin, A New Technique Makes Abortions Possible Earlier, N.Y.
TiMES, Dec. 21, 1997, at Al.
61. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
62. Id. at 504.
63. Id. at 563 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 563 n.7.
66. Id. at 522 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also RiCE, supra note 57, at
62-63.
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"[N]owadays many, if not most, Americans die because
someone-doctors, family members or they themselves has
decided that it is time for them to go. What might be called
managed deaths, as distinct from suicides, are now the norm in
the United States, doctors say. The American Hospital Associa-
tion says that about 70 percent of the deaths in hospitals happen
after a decision has been made to withhold treatment. Other
patients die when the medication they are taking to ease their
pain depresses, then stops, their breathing .. . 'It's called passive
euthanasia,' said Dr. Norman Fost, director of the Program in
Medical Ethics at the University of Wisconsin. 'You can ask who's
involved and is it really consensual, but there is no question that
these are planned deaths. We know who is dying. Patients aren't
just found dead in their beds.'" 67 "'My intent,' said Dr. Maurie
Markman of the Cleveland Clinic, 'always is to relieve suffering.
If that's my goal, I can look myself in the eye. I can go to sleep at
night.' "68
In the 1997 right-to-die cases, the Supreme Court invited the
states to turn a blind eye to euthanasia committed by withdrawal
of food and water or by palliatives and sedation. All of these
techniques can be morally justified in cases where they are
employed without the intent to kill. In some cases they are
employed with the intent to kill, which would appear to be the
case when food and water are withdrawn from a patient who is
not dying, who is not in significant distress and who has been
kept alive by the feeding tube. Proponents of euthanasia do not
have to assume the burden of justifying the overt techniques of a
Dr. Jack Kevorkian. The Supreme Court has given them a green
light to practice euthanasia under the guise of legitimate use of
palliative care, sedation or withdrawal of treatment. Nor is it
likely that such euthanasia will be limited to consenting patients.
Rising health care costs will exert pressure on family, guardians,
etc., to opt for termination of life in cases of the incompetent,
the aged and the disabled. "The assisted-suicide debate has
called the question on the health-care profession," said Dr.
Steven Miles of the University of Minnesota, an expert in end-of-
life care. "The public is demanding assisted suicide, in part
because they are justifiably afraid of the quality of end-of-life
care. There is a demand for a new paradigm, and the paradigm
is palliative care. '"69 In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme
67. Gina Kolata, The Supreme Court: Likely Consequences; 'Passive Euthanasia'
in Hospitals is the Norm, Doctors Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1997, at A10.
68. Id.
69. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Cies of the Dying Awaken Doctors to a New Approach,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997, at Al.
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Court commented on the evolution of euthanasia in the Nether-
lands, where the practice is not to prosecute for active assisted
suicide:
This concern is further supported by evidence about the
practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands. The Dutch gov-
ernment's own study revealed that in 1990, there were
2,300 cases of voluntary euthanasia (defined as "the delib-
erate termination of another's life at his request"), 400
cases of assisted suicide, and more than 1,000 cases of
euthanasia without an explicit request. In addition to
these latter 1,000 cases, the study found an additional
4,941 cases where physicians administered lethal morphine
overdoses without the patients' explicit consent .... This
study suggests that, despite the existence of various report-
ing procedures, euthanasia in the Netherlands has not
been limited to competent, terminally ill adults who are
enduring physical suffering, and that regulation of the
practice may not have prevented abuses in cases involving
vulnerable persons, including severely disabled neonates
and elderly persons suffering from dementia.7 °
The Supreme Court noted the Netherlands' experience to
justify Washington's judgment that allowing assisted suicide
could lead to involuntary euthanasia. It would appear, however,
that the allowance of "passive" measures for ending life has the
same potential to slide into involuntary termination. This would
appear to be especially so in light of the aging of the population
of the United States:
The population is rapidly growing older and will continue
to do so in the next half-century. Between 1995 and 2010,
the population of people 65 and older will grow slowly by
about 6 million, from 33.5 million to 39.4 million, as peo-
ple born in the 1930's and early 1940's (when fertility was
low) age. By contrast, between 2010 and 2030, with the
baby boomers aging, the number will soar by about 30 mil-
lion, from 39.4 million to 69.3 million. Meanwhile, the
population in the prime working ages of 20 to 59 will
remain stationary at 160 million. In 1900, there were 10
times as many children below 18 as there were adults over
70. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2274 (1997) (citing
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTrHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS: A REPORT OF
CHAimAN CHARLES T. CANADY TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE HOUSE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 104TH CONG., 2D SEss., at 12-13
(Comm. Print 1996).
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65. By 2030, there will be slightly more people over 65
than under 18.
In fact, the population is aging because both fertility and
mortality rates are below their long-term historic averages.
Unless fertility rates increase, the population will not
become younger even after the boomers have left the
scene.
7 1
Who will support all those old and infirm people? The utili-
tarian answer is, as Colorado Governor Richard Lamm said to the
elderly: 'You've got a duty to die and get out of the way. Let the
other society, our kids, build a reasonable life."72
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE MISGUIDED EFFORT OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT TO REGULATE ABORTION
THROUGH AN INCREMENTAL APPROACH.
Candor requires an assessment of the role the establishment
pro-life movement, including the National Right to Life Commit-
tee and the bureaucratic apparatus of the Catholic bishops, has
played in solidifying in our law and culture the underlying
nonpersonhood premise of Roe v. Wade.
The years immediately following Roe presented an opportu-
nity to reverse it on its basic holding before the cultural acquies-
cence in legalized abortion put such a remedy beyond reach. On
March 7, 1974, Cardinals Krol, Manning, Cody and Medeiros tes-
tified before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amend-
ments. They insisted on restoration of constitutional protection
to an unborn child as a person. And they refused to support the
Buckley Amendment which purported to restore personhood
but would have allowed abortion to save the life of the mother.
The Cardinals said that "the prohibition against the direct and
intentional taking of innocent human life should be universal
and without exceptions." As Cardinal Krol put it, "I could not
endorse any wording that would allow for direct abortion. '73 If
the pro-life movement had held fast to that position, the constitu-
tional and cultural situation would be more favorable to the right
to life than it is today.
71. Samuel H. Preston, Children Will Pay, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 29, 1996,
at 97, 97.
72. Gov. Lamm Asserts Elderly, if Very Ill, Have 'Duty to Die', N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31, 1984, at A16.
73. Abortion and the Constitution: Hearings on S.J. Res. 119 and S.j Res. 1340
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1974) (statement of Cardinal Krol); see also 4
Cardinals Urge U.S. Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1974, at 40.
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Since at least 1981, major elements of the pro-life establish-
ment, including the Catholic bishops' bureaucracy, have
retreated from the Cardinals' position. They have themselves
promoted incremental legislation that would allow abortion for
the life or health of the mother and in pregnancies caused by
rape or incest and for minors with parental consent."4 And they
have urged the states' rights solution which would allow the
states to allow or forbid abortion.75 Both the incremental and
states' rights approaches, however, affirm the nonpersonhood
holding of Roe. If an innocent human being is subject to execu-
tion at the discretion of another whenever the legislature so
decrees, he is a nonperson with no constitutional right to live.
These compromise approaches are advanced as a method of
saving lives. But it is fair to suggest that they have increased the
toll of lives from abortion. For example, the enactment of a
requirement that an unmarried minor obtain parental consent
before an abortion does in fact decrease the number of abortions
from those under a previously unrestricted law. But that compar-
ison is oversimplified. A more reliable comparison would be
between a situation, on the one hand, where the law was either
wholly permissive or required parental consent, and, on the
other, a situation where the pro-life movement was insisting that
the law can never rightly allow the murder of the innocent. A
law allowing abortion with parental consent treats the killing of
an unborn child as qualitatively the same as getting one's ears
pierced. And ideas have consequences. The incremental strat-
egy, which seeks to regulate rather than prohibit abortion, con-
veys to the public the message that even the "pro-life" advocates
agree that innocent life is negotiable.
The dominant abortions of the near future will be commit-
ted by pills, implants or other devices. The only way that the law
can reach such early abortions will be by licensing and prescrip-
tion restrictions and similar regulations, and such will be largely
ineffective with respect to items that have non-abortive as well as
abortive uses. Moreover, the only way to mobilize sufficient sup-
port for any such restrictions will be to restore the public convic-
tion that all life is sacred and must be protected by the law. The
incremental strategy, which seeks to regulate rather than pro-
hibit abortion, undermines that conviction because it permeates
74. See MoRNING ADvoCATE, June 21, 1991, at 1 (Baton Rouge, La.); see
also AMERICAN LIFE LEAGUE, LEGISLETrER, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 2.
75. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT,
NEWSLETTER, Sept. 21, 1981; see also NATIONAL CATHOLIC REGISTER, Jan. 10,
1982, at 4; NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Nov. 23, 1981, at 1.
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the public discourse with the message that even the "pro-life"
advocates agree that innocent life is negotiable.
Consider one local example. Station KELO-TV in Sioux
Falls, South Dakota, conducted polls on abortion in late 1990
and late 1991. In 1991 the major pro-life effort in South Dakota
was an attempt to forbid abortions except for rape, incest, and
the life or physical health of the mother. After that campaign,
the second poll, identical to the first and covering the same audi-
ence, showed that more people favored some abortion, and
fewer opposed all abortions, than had been the case with the first
poll. "l[T] he large body of the public who remain 'unsure' where
they stand on abortion look to committed pro-lifers and pro-
death forces to help develop their views. And with many pro-
lifers willing to allow some abortions legislatively, it appears the
public has followed their lead. As a result, we have lost ground
with the public."76
The 1992 and 1996 presidential elections confirm that a pro-
life strategy of compromise contributes to the institutionalization
of the abortion ethic. In those campaigns, Bill Clinton took the
totally pro-abortion position. The "pro-life" candidates, George
Bush, and Bob Dole, backed by the pro-life movement, sup-
ported legalized abortion in life of the mother, rape and incest
cases.
Various polls, including the Washington Post-ABC News,
Gallup, election day exit polls and others, indicate that those
campaigns confirmed and reinforced the trend toward public
acceptance of legalized abortion that has been evident since Roe
was decided in 1973. Only about twenty percent believe abortion
should not be legal. "The public's attitude toward abortion
largely lines up with President Clinton's phrase that abortions
should be 'safe, legal and rare,' said [University of Maryland Pro-
fessor] Elizabeth Adell Cook . . . co-author of 'Between Two
Absolutes,' an analysis of public opinion on abortion .... Studies
indicate an emerging consensus that 'it should be allowed under
some circumstances but it isn't to be taken too lightly,' Dr. Cook
said. . . . 'People think if there's a serious enough reason, it's
O.K., but if they don't think the reason is compelling enough,
they think it's wrong.' ,77 Support for legalized abortion coexists
in the minds of many with their acknowledgment that abortion is
murder: "In responses so paradoxical that they astound even
experts like Dr. Cook, one third of the poll's respondents who
76. Paul R. Dorr, REscuE THE PERISHING, Jan. 1992, at 1.
77. Corey Goldberg & Janet Elder, Public Still Backs Abortion, but Wants
Limits, Poll Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at Al.
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said they considered abortion to be murder also agreed that
abortion is sometimes the best course in a bad situation.78
Law is an educator. And Roe v. Wade has accelerated the
dominance of a secular, relativist and individualistic ethic in
which the right to life of the innocent is negotiable because it is
evaluated according to the utilitarian norms characteristic of a
pagan culture. It would be unfair to lay responsibility for this
development simply at the feet of the establishment pro-life
movement. That movement, however, has contributed to that
development. It has forfeited its responsibility, which is its rea-
son for being, to affirm the absolute sanctity of innocent life.
Instead, it has bought into the pagan culture by itself treating the
right to live as a political issue as negotiable as a highway appro-
priation. It has sought tactical, political victories at the price of
strategic retreat.
The campaign to ban Partial Birth Abortion (PBA) won a
major tactical victory by raising awareness of the depravity of the
abortion culture. That campaign, however, is likely to have the
unintended effect of reinforcing that culture. The PBA, despite
its gruesome character, is qualitatively no different from any
other abortion method. Unfortunately, the focus of the cam-
paign on the method of the PBA killing, distracted attention to
some extent from the reality that the law can never validly toler-
ate any abortion or any other intentional execution of the inno-
cent. For example, the pamphlet distributed nationally by the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops headlined its first page:
"4/5 Infanticide, 1/5 Abortion," and went on to say, "Why all the
furor over partial birth abortion? Because unlike any other abor-
tion, this procedure kills a living infant when she is almost fully
delivered from her mother's womb. It's a painful, brutal proce-
dure that's paving the way to open infanticide."79 Abortion, how-
ever, is not wrong because it leads to infanticide. All abortion is
wrong in itself. If it is not wrong, what is wrong with infanticide?
While it was legitimate and tactically effective to describe the PBA
as practically infanticide, that tactic invited a strategic defeat,
reinforcing the abortion culture by focusing on the method of
the murder rather than on the murder as such.
These comments are not intended as a reflection on the
proponents of the PBA ban. The effort to ban PBAs was, of
course, flawed in its allowance of the PBA to save the life of the
mother. If the PBA is such a horrendous atrocity that it must be
78. See id.
79. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BisHops, 4/5 INFANTICIDE, 1/5
ABORTION 1 (undated leaflet) (on file with author).
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banned, why should it-or any other type of abortion for that
matter-be allowed in order to save the life of the mother? Since
when should any civilized society allow the intentional killing of
an innocent, helpless non-aggressor even to save the life of the
killer? If two people are on a one-man raft in the ocean, the law
does not give one the right to throw the other overboard.8 °
Given the moribund state of the establishment pro-life move-
ment, however, the PBA effort was a tactically effective attempt to
jump-start the pro-life effort. And the public commitment of the
Catholic bishops and their agencies to that effort was laudable
and courageous. Nevertheless, the PBA effort is a testimony to
the weakness rather than the strength of the pro-life movement.
In any civilized society, the issue must be whether innocent
human beings may be intentionally and legally killed. Over the
past two decades, however, the establishment pro-life leaders
have sought to limit, but not wholly prohibit, abortion, thus fram-
ing the issue as which innocents may be killed. The campaign to
prohibit partial-birth abortion is a further retreat, framing the
issue not in terms of whether, and not even in terms of which, but
in terms of how innocent human beings may be legally executed.
A Note on the Principles Governing Incremental Legislation
The principles governing legislation on abortion were
spelled out byJohn Paul II in Evangelium Vitae, where he said that
"a civil law authorizing abortion or euthanasia ceases by that very
fact to be a true, morally binding civil law.... In the case of an
intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or
euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to 'take part in
a propaganda campaign in favour of such a law, or vote for it."81
The Pope went on to examine the responsibility of legislators
where a legislative vote would be decisive for the passage of
a more restrictive law, aimed at limiting the number of
authorized abortions, in place of a more permissive law
already passed or ready to be voted on.... [W] hen it is not
possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion
law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition
to procured abortion was well known, could licitly support
proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and
at lessening its negative consequences at the level of gen-
eral opinion and public morality. This [is] not in fact an
80. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842)
(No. 15,383); Regina v. Dudley & Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
81. POPEJOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE Nos. 72-73 (1995) [hereinafter
EVANGELIUM VITAE].
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illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legiti-
mate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.
8 2
Note that the Pope says that a legislator "could" licitly sup-
port such a proposal. He does not say that he "should." This
leaves open the prudential question of whether pro-life support
for such compromise measures might actually increase the "nega-
tive consequences" of legalized abortion "at the level of general
opinion and public morality," especially when such compromises
are promoted by "pro-life" advocates themselves. This is not to
say that a legislator is acting immorally if he reluctantly votes as a
last resort for a bill that would allow some abortions, e.g., with
parental consent or for rape, incest, or the life of the mother.
But it is to say that his action is self-defeating.
A separate question is whether the requirements of No. 73
are met in a particular case, especially with respect to a legislator
making "well known" his "absolute personal opposition to pro-
cured abortion." Many legislators who seek cover under No. 73
do not fulfill its terms. In such cases, their actions would not
appear to be morallyjustified. However, it is not fruitful to ques-
tion whether they are acting morally. Instead a prudent response
would be simply to state the terms of No. 73, emphasizing that
even in its stated circumstances, it says "could," not "should," and
then address the reality that the incremental approach is unjusti-
fied in prudential terms. We are reminded again that the first
problem with pragmatism is that it does not work.
Probably the most intimidating argument for the incre-
mental approach is that we have a duty to save whatever
lives we can. Don't you want to save lives? Why will you
permit babies, whom you could save, to be killed just
because you can't get a perfect law? Support for partial
protection of the right to live can be morally justified, as
Bishop John J. Myers put it, "only if the legislator decides
there is at that time no reasonable hope of enacting legisla-
tion which would protect equally all unborn children."
However, for more than a decade, the pro-life movement
has shown a virtually automatic tendency to slide from
reluctantly accepting exceptions to actively promoting
them. A form of Gresham's Law operates here. The pro-
life political climate is dominated by those who have con-
vinced themselves that full protection cannot be enacted,
without ever really having tried to achieve it. And no one
even bothers to seriously promote bills that would restore
full protection. Those who might do so are dissuaded by
82. Id. at No. 73.
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the argument that to do so would be divisive. So if Able
introduces a bill to forbid some abortions and to allow
others, support for that bill becomes the test of pro-life sol-
idarity. If Baker introduces a no-exception prohibition of
abortion and refuses to support Able's compromise bill,
Baker is labeled as divisive. Able, however, is not required
to support Baker's no-exception bill because everyone
knows that it is impractical and visionary. Bad bills drive
out the missing, no-exception position. The no-exception
position has not failed. It has never really been tried. The
point is not that the proposal of exceptions is necessarily
immoral, but that, in prudential terms it is inherently self-
defeating.
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Evangelium Vitae does not precisely address the morality of
endorsement or acceptance of exceptions by others than legisla-
tors. In No. 28, John Paul asserts that "we all [have] the ines-
capable responsibility of choosing to be unconditionally pro-life."' 4
However, since a legislator "could licitly support" exceptions in
the circumstances defined in No. 73, pro-life individuals and
groups could assist him in drafting and explaining such legisla-
tion. Evangelium Vitae does not specifically address the limits of
such assistance in its discussion of cooperation in No. 74.85 At
some point, of course, pro-life organizations could exceed the
bounds of permissible material cooperation in their work on
exception provisions.
Similarly, while a pro-life voter could morally vote in some
situations for the less objectionable of two pro-abortion candi-
dates, that course, too, has failed to work. That approach in
practice has subordinated pro-life principles to the interests and
judgment of "the great human scourge of the twentieth century:
the professional politician." 6 Professional politicians not only
do not fear the compromising pro-lifers; they eat them for break-
fast. The politicians half-heartedly endorse marginal pro-life pro-
posals in exchange for pro-life endorsement of their re-election
campaigns. And the pro-lifers give the politicians a veto power
over their agenda by proposing only those proposals likely to get
the approval of the politicians. Solely concerned with re-elec-
tion, the politicians know they can placate the pro-lifers with
small-change rhetoric and guarded endorsements of peripheral
bills without arousing the focused opposition of the pro-abortion
83. RICE, supra note 57, at 86-87.
84. EVANGELIUM VrrAE, supra note 81, at No. 28.
85. See generally id. at No. 74.
86. PAUL JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES 510 (1985).
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camp. The "practical" pro-lifers are so devoted to politics as "the
art of the possible" that they risk becoming professional politi-
cians themselves. As Solzhenitsyn asked, "Is it not true that pro-
fessional politicians are boils on the neck of society that prevent
it from turning its head and moving its arms?""7 The political
pro-life movement will be counterproductive until it stops play-
ing politics and stands firm on the basic truth that the law can
never validly tolerate the intentional killing of innocent human
beings. Our only chance to succeed is through fidelity to the
truth. But we should be faithful to the truth on this matter of
life-and-death principle whether it brings political success or not.
We should be "faithful," wrote Charles Colson because, "we are
motivated not by a desire to make an impact on society but by
obedience to God's Word and a desire to please him. When our
goal becomes success rather than faithfulness, we lose the single-
minded focus of obedience and any real power to be
successful.""
In a perceptive letter to the New York Times, Jason McNeill
said the approval of RU486
may end up galvanizing the anti-abortion movement rather
than squelching it. RU-486 can be prescribed by any doc-
tor, not just abortionists, so no one will know when a
woman is using it. But RU-486 is used only in the early
stages of pregnancy. Late-term and mid-term abortions
will continue in the abortion clinics. These late abortions
will now become the focus. As more Americans realize that
abortion clinics serve no purpose but to kill viable babies,
the opposition to mid- and late-term abortions will grow,
and the anti-abortion movement will gain even more
steam.8 9
Mr. McNeill is probably right. The establishment pro-life
movement will continue its campaign to impose marginal restric-
tions on surgical abortions. The National Right to Life Commit-
tee, the Christian Coalition and other elements in the pro-life
establishment take no position on contraception. However,
abortifacients that prevent implantation of the embryo in the
womb are now treated by the medical profession, and increas-
ingly by the law, as contraceptives. Neither such abortifacients,
87. ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO, PART I 391
(1973).
88. Charles Colson, Living in the New Dark Ages, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct.
20, 1989, at 30, 32; see also RICE, supra note 57, at 110.
89. Jason McNeill, Abortion Pill Will Galvanize the Opposition, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1996, at A14 (letter to the editor).
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nor later-acting abortifacients such as RU-486, are likely to be
effectively opposed by the pro-life establishment which is fixated
on its marginal effort to restrict the increasingly obsolete surgical
abortions.
V. THE DECISIVE IMPACT OF THE CONTRACEPTIVE ETHIC
It was not until 1930, with the Anglican Lambeth Confer-
ence, that any Christian denomination ever said that contracep-
tion could ever be objectively right.9 ° Contraception prevents
life while abortion kills existing life. But both involve the deliber-
ate separation of the unitive and procreative aspects of sex. In
his 1968 encyclical, Humanae Vitae, Pope Paul VI stressed that the
law of God prohibits "any action which either before, at the
moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to
prevent procreation, whether as an end or a means."91 This
teaching "is based on the inseparable connection, established by
God, which man on his own initiative may not break, between
the unitive significance and the procreative significance."9 2 And
a contraceptive society requires abortion as a backup for cases in
which contraception fails or is not used. The availability of abor-
tion is also a factor in the decision of some to engage in sexual
relations without using contraception. Also many so-called con-
traceptives are abortifacient in that they cause the destruction of
the developing human being.
In Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul noted that
the pro-abortion culture is especially strong precisely
where the Church's teaching on contraception is rejected.
Certainly, from the moral point of view, contraception and
abortion are specifically different evils: the former contra-
dicts the full truth of the sexual act as the proper expres-
sion of conjugal love, while the latter destroys the life of a
human being .... But despite their differences of nature
and moral gravity, contraception and abortion are often
closely connected, as fruits of the same tree. It is true that
in many cases contraception and even abortion are prac-
ticed under the pressure of real-life difficulties, which
nonetheless can never exonerate from striving to observe
God's law fully. Still, in very many other instances such
practices are rooted in a hedonistic mentality unwilling to
90. See Charles A. Selden, Lambeth Bishops Back Arbitration for All Peoples,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1930, at 1.
91. POPE PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE No. 14 (1968) [hereinafter HUMANAE
VITAE].
92. Id. at No. 12.
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accept responsibility in matters of sexuality, and they imply
a self-centered concept of freedom, which regards procrea-
don as an obstacle to personal fulfillment. The life which
could result from a sexual encounter thus becomes an
enemy to be avoided at all costs, and abortion becomes the
only possible decisive response to contraception. The
close connection between . . . contraception
and.., abortion.., is being demonstrated in an alarming
way by the development of chemical products, intrauterine
devices and vaccines which, distributed with the same ease
as contraceptives, really act as abortifacients in the very
early stages of the development of the life of the new
human being.... [T] here exists in contemporary culture a
certain Promethean attitude which leads people to think
that they can control life and death by taking the decisions
about them into their own hands.9"
The acceptance of contraception affirms that man, rather
than God, is the arbiter of when life shall begin:
At the origin of every human person there is a creative act
of God. No man comes into existence by chance; he is
always the object of God's creative love. From this funda-
mental truth of faith and reason it follows that the procrea-
tive capacity, inscribed in human sexuality, is-in its
deepest truth-a cooperation with God's creative power.
It also follows that men and women are not the arbiters,
are not the masters of this same capacity, called as they are,
in it and through it, to be participants in God's creative
decision. When, therefore, through contraception, mar-
ried couples remove from the exercise of their conjugal
sexuality its potential procreative capacity, they claim a
power which belongs solely to God: the power to decide, in
a final analysis, the coming into existence of a human per-
son. They assume the qualification not of being coopera-
tors in God's creative power, but the ultimate depositories
of the source of human life.
In this perspective, contraception is being judged, objec-
tively, so profoundly unlawful as never to be, for any rea-
son, justified. To think or to say the contrary is equal to
maintaining that in human life situations may arise in
which it is lawful not to recognize God as God.94
93. EVANGELIUM VrrAE, supra note 81, at Nos. 13, 15.
94. Pope John Paul II, Discourse, Sept. 17, 1983, in 28 THE POPE SPEARS
356, 356-57 (1983); see also RICE, supra note 57, at 47-50.
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If, through contraception, man makes himself the arbiter of
when life begins, he will predictably make himself the arbiter,
through abortion, suicide and euthanasia, of when it ends. All
are based on a utilitarian approach. The acceptance of contra-
ception and abortion accustomed people to the idea that some
lives are not worth living, that they are not worth bringing into
existence or continuing in existence. This attitude clears the way
for euthanasia of the terminally ill, the retarded and others
whose lives are considered "useless." Euthanasia is postnatal
abortion, as abortion is prenatal euthanasia. More than three
decades of contraception and abortion have left the United
States with a diminished pool of workers to support the elderly,
sick and disabled. In 1900, there were 10 times as many children
below 18 as there were adults over 65. By 2030, there will be
slightly more people over 65 than under 18. Fittingly, John
Paul II described euthanasia as
one of the more alarming symptoms of the 'culture of
death,' . . . in prosperous societies, marked by [a] preoccu-
pation with efficiency . . . which sees . . . elderly and dis-
abled people as intolerable and too burdensome. These
people are . . . isolated by their families and by society,
which are organized ... on ... criteria of productive effi-
ciency, according to which a hopelessly impaired life no
longer has any value.
96
The prevailing culture "presents recourse to contraception, ster-
ilization, abortion and even euthanasia as a mark of progress and
a victory of freedom, while depicting as enemies of freedom and
progress those positions which are unreservedly pro-life. 97
Contraception is the defining vice of our age. The cultural
acceptance of the separation of sex from procreation has contrib-
uted to the trivialization of sex. Man (of both sexes) is entirely
the arbiter of whether it shall be recreational or procreational.
Apart from its impact with respect to abortion and euthanasia,
the dominance of the contraceptive ethic is a factor in other cul-
turally significant developments. For example, pornography, like
contraception, involves the separation of sex from life and the
reduction of sex to an exercise in self-gratification. Humanae
Vitae warned that contraception would cause women to be viewed
as sex objects, that
a man, who grows accustomed to the use of contraceptive
methods may forget the reverence due to a woman and,
95. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
96. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 81, at No. 64.
97. Id. at No. 17.
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disregarding her physical and emotional equilibrium,
reduce her to being a mere instrument of his own desires,
no longer considering her his partner whom he should
surround with care and affection.9 8
While contraception is the taking of the unitive without the
procreative, in vitro fertilization is the reverse. If we insist on the
right to take the recreational without the procreational, how can
we object to the reverse? Nor is there any realistic prospect of
putting the brakes on human cloning without restoring the con-
viction that God, and not man, is the arbiter of when and how
human life begins and ends. Human cloning will be regulated
but it is unlikely that any effective prohibition of it will be
enacted in the prevailing culture which is characterized by the
dominance of technology liberated from moral restraints.
Moreover the cultural toleration of promiscuity, divorce and
homosexual activity cannot be understood apart from the under-
lying premises of the contraceptive ethic. According to the natu-
ral moral law and the Commandments, sex is reserved for
marriage because sex is inherently connected with procreation
and the natural way to raise children is in a marriage. But if,
through contraception, we claim the power to decide whether
sex will have anything to do with procreation, why should we
have to reserve sex for marriage? In the natural order, marriage
should be permanent because sex is inherently related to procre-
ation and children should be raised by parents permanently mar-
ried to each other. But if it is entirely up to us whether sex will
have any relation to children, if sex and marriage are not intrinsi-
cally related to new life, then marriage loses its reason for
permanence.
Similarly, if sex has no inherent relation to procreation, and
if man, rather than God, is the arbiter of whether and when it
will have that relation, on what ground other than the pragmatic
and esthetic can homosexuals be denied the right to marry? The
contraceptive society cannot say that homosexual activity is objec-
tively wrong without denying its own basic premises.
9 9
VI. WHAT, IF ANYrHING, CAN BE DONE AT THIS TIME TO
RESTORE THE RIGHT TO LIFE?
In legal terms, the short answer is: Not much.
98. Hu sANAE VITAE, supra note 91, at Nos. 17.
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There is no practical prospect, for the foreseeable future, of
restoring authentic legal protection to the right to life. Instead, a
restoration of that protection will be achieved only through the
building, from the bottom up, of a new "culture of life" affirming
the dignity of every human being, without exception, as a person
created in the image and likeness of God. "[W] e are facing", said
John Paul II, "an enormous and dramatic clash between good
and evil, death and life, the 'culture of death ' and the 'culture of
life.' We find ourselves not only 'faced with' but necessarily 'in
the midst of' this conflict: we are all involved and we all share in
it, with the responsibility of choosing to be unconditionally pro-
life." 100 Numerous private initiatives, including pregnancy help
centers, the home-school movement and other efforts to reclaim
education from the secular state, and a growing movement to
affirm and live to "family values," all reflect the reality that many
are living counter-culturally by "choosing to be unconditionally
pro-life." "God is preparing a great springtime for Christianity,"
said John Paul in The Mission of the Redeemer, in 1990, "and we can
already see its first signs." 1 '
In a sense, we suffer from the 60's and 70's generation in
power. But, like an oil slick on a river', this, too, will pass. Pro-life
legal efforts should be directed not toward the maintenance of a
corrupted constitutional and legal order, but rather toward keep-
ing the state off the backs of those who choose to live "uncondi-
tionally pro-life." In this way, a "culture of life" can emerge from
the bottom up. As that culture matures, the legal system will fol-
low. Perhaps the most encouraging sign is the reaction of young
people to the Vicar of Christ:
The youth of the 90s are not the youth of the 60s. The
youth of the 90s have been forced to grow up with the mis-
takes and moral nightmares of the 60s generation: drugs,
illicit sex widely condoned, addition, abortion and the Cul-
ture of Death which flowed from this ill-conceived social
revolution. Divorce deprived them of parents and stability.
Contraception deprived them of brothers and sisters, often
replaced by the toys and junk of materialism. Euthanasia
and assisted suicide threaten to deprive them of the wis-
dom of age and reverence for suffering.
Where the 60s generation eschewed authority, the 90s gen-
eration craves and recognizes legitimate authority. Legitimate
authority is the authority of love. God's love which John
Paul II radiates. You can't kid kids. The youth of today
100. EVANGELIUM VrTAE, supra note 81, at No. 28.
101. JOHN PAUL II, REDEMPTORIS Missio No. 86 (1990).
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love John Paul II because his message is difficult, not despite
it. They know he loves them enough to tell them the truth.
They know he is calling them to a love and beauty that
does not come cheap and does not always make one popu-
lar, but which is worth it. They know well the pain and
squalor of the alternative.
They also know that if they were born after 1973 their sta-
tus is that of survivor. They could not be blamed for think-
ing, "Thirty-seven million others were aborted, why not
me?" Children have been discarded in one way or another
for the last 35 years, while their elders pursued vanity and
the way of the Self. Children got in the way. In truth, the
only thing wrong with the younger generation is that there
are not enough of them.
Alternatively, John Paul II, the greatest figure on the world
stage, throws his arms open to the youth and proclaims,
"You are my hope!" And they have responded to him in
kind for almost 20 years
0 2
A detailed discussion of the emerging "culture of life" is beyond
the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that the legal develop-
ments noted here with respect to abortion, euthanasia and other
issues reflect the character of this era as one of inescapable and
fundamental choice.
With the approach of the millennium and the total or near
collapse of many ideologies rooted in atheism-most notably
Marxism, Freudianism, and Darwinism-there appears to be an
increasing return to a radical choice for humanity, not unlike the
one represented in the first centuries of the Christian era, that
between a fixed credal, hierarchical Christianity, with its sacra-
mental system and the message of the 'gift of self,' and a despair-
ing hedonistic paganism with its corollaries in Gnostic and
'nature' religions, the modern forms of which are worship of pro-
gress and modern science."' 3
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